In Commonwealth v. Dobson, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that a police officer’s pat-down frisk of a passenger in a vehicle was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable suspicion.
The Facts & Procedural History
Officer Jerome Duncan responded to a call of “shots fired” and arrived within minutes whereupon he observed a vehicle run a red light (the call did not provide a description of any particular vehicle involved). Officer Duncan positioned himself behind the vehicle and activated his lights and siren. The vehicle began to slow down but did not immediately stop. The vehicle made a right turn into an apartment complex and parked.
The driver of the vehicle exited the vehicle and began to speak with another officer on scene who had responded to assist Officer Duncan. Officer Duncan eventually learned the driver’s license was suspended due to a prior DUI conviction and that the rear passenger had an active bench warrant. The rear passenger was arrested.
Officer Duncan then asked the defendant, and front passenger, Jeff Dobson, to step out of the vehicle. The Court notes that “Dobson had no active arrest warrants, did not make any furtive movements, did not attempt to flee, did not reach for his waistband, and did not attempt to place something under the seat of the vehicle. In fact, Dobson did not act suspicious or nervous in any way.”
Nevertheless, Officer Duncan frisked Dobson for “weapons for officer safety” out of a concern that he could be “concealing a weapon of any sort.” The frisk revealed a gun and Dobson was placed under arrest. While at the police station, when asked if he had any contraband, Dobson admitted that he had cocaine in his underwear, which was recovered by Officer Duncan. Dobson was charged with the gun and cocaine.
The defense moved to suppress the gun and cocaine. The trial court denied the suppression motion and Dobson was convicted at trial and sentenced to 6-15 years in prison. The defense appealed the trial court’s suppression ruling.
The Law
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons… against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause… particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The seminal case of Terry v. Ohio provides an exception to the general rule under the Fourth Amendment. Terry authorizes a police officer to conduct “a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” The officer must “demonstrate specific and articulable grounds that would lead a ‘reasonably prudent man in the circumstances’ to believe that ‘his safety or that of others was in danger.'”
Further, justification for a Terry frisk requires that:
“[t]he individualized ‘justification for a seizure is central to the Terry doctrine, inherent in the requirement that an investigative detention must be premised upon specific and articulable facts particular to the detained individual.’ Accordingly, a Terry frisk must be based upon the ‘whole picture’ and can proceed only when there exists a ‘particularized and objective basis’ to believe that the ‘particular person’ is armed and dangerous.”
Importantly, an “individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”
The Court’s Reasoning — Fourth Amendment Terry Frisk
The Court holds Officer Duncan’s Terry frisk of Dobson to be without reasonable suspicions which, therefore, violates the Fourth Amendment to the U.S Constitution.
The Court admonishes the trial court for relying almost exclusively on the officer’s testimony that the incident occurred in a “high-crime area” and that the driver did not immediately stop the vehicle when signaled to do so, his suspended license, and the rear passenger’s bench warrant for DUI. Although a court is not to rely on subjective testimony to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, but rather make such a determination from the “standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,” the Court holds that “there were no circumstances from which a reasonable officer could infer that Dobson was armed and dangerous.”
The Court discounts many of the facts of this case because there was no logical connection between them and a “reasonable, particular, and individualized belief that Dobson was armed and dangerous.” Dobson was not driving the vehicle. The vehicle was not operated in a reckless manner, nor did it indicate involvement in some violent event. The 911 caller made no mention of any particular vehicle that may have been involved in a shooting. The driver’s suspended license and his fairly innocuous behavior in no way raises any inferences as to Dobson, nor does the rear passenger’s bench warrant for DUI.
The Court notes that none of the foregoing factors, either in isolation, or (as courts are supposed to view such facts) in their totality, “should cause a trained, objectively reasonable officer to believe that Dobson was armed and dangerous.” The only factor that supports the existence of reasonable suspicion is the officer’s testimony that they were in a high-crime area at the time of the incident. While the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this factor as one to be considered in a court’s determination of the existence of reasonable suspicion, here, the Court shows great skepticism over its continued viability in Pennsylvania, observing:
“it appears that some harbor a belief that a person’s mere presence within the blurred and amorphous boundaries of a so-called high-crime area suffices to create reasonable suspicion or probable cause. It is well-past time for this Court to quash this misguided belief. Moreover, the time to reconsider whether the high-crime area designation — which is often invoked in quasi-totemic fashion and supported by nothing more than a bald assertion by an individual police officer — is a relevant constitutional factor in our search and seizure analysis is long overdue.”
The Bottom Line
The Court got it right in this instance. Unlike in my analysis of People v. Messano, another reasonable suspicion case in which the Court reaches an absurd conclusion, here, the Court properly analyzes the facts.
Although I disagree with the Court’s aversion to the high-crime area designation as a factor to be considered in a reasonable suspicion analysis, I find its assessment of the remaining factors to be on point. I was a former law enforcement officer, and I have lived these facts. I can almost imagine them as if I were Officer Duncan and arrested Dobson myself.
However, a call of shots fired (without more specific information), a less than perfect yielding to lights and sirens, a driver who steps out of the car without being asked — with a suspended license, and a passenger with a bench warrant for DUI, without more, just isn’t enough. Sure, throw in the high crime area designation. Still, not enough. I get it, these are all indicators of — something. Any law enforcement officer will tell you that. But I know what they don‘t indicate — an armed and dangerous passenger.
Don’t get me wrong, the foregoing are all relevant factors. None are to be discounted. But other than the high-crime designation, none raise any reasonably, objective suspicion that Dobson was armed and dangerous. And, of course, a high-crime designation alone, is not enough. Unfortunately, Officer Duncan just didn’t have it — or at least he didn’t articulate it.
John Q. Prosecutor