In Trappman v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. and Florida Constitutions does not apply when the defendant is convicted and punished for two criminal acts that result from separate impulses during the course of a single criminal episode.
The Facts and Procedural History
Police responded to the home of David William Trappman to execute an arrest warrant for his wife. Trappman was uncooperative and shoved an officer during the course of the arrest while holding his two dogs. After shoving the officer, Trappman let one of the dogs go and sicced him on the officer, causing scarring. Trappman was arrested for battery for shoving the officer and aggravated battery for siccing the dog on the officer. He was convicted and punished on both counts.
Trappman appealed the convictions and punishment as violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions.
The Law
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice in jeopardy of life or limb.” This provision applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Constitution contains a similar provision which mirrors in scope the federal prohibition.
The Double Jeopardy Clause, among other protections, prohibits “multiple punishments for the same offense.” For an offense to be “the same” it must be “the same in law and in fact.” [emphasis in original]. The seminal case in Double Jeopardy Clause analysis is Blockburger v. United States which offers two analytical frameworks for determining whether an offense is “the same.” The first is called the “distinct acts” test (same in fact). The second is called the “different elements” test (same in law).
The “different elements” test asks whether each criminal statute requires proof of a fact (or element) that is not required of the other. If not, then they are not the same offense. The “distinct acts” test asks whether each criminal act “indicate[s] a different impulse to violate the statute.” In other words, “multiple punishments for violations of a single criminal [statute] are permissible if the [statute] is aimed at singular acts – as opposed to a continuous offense or course of criminal conduct – and the defendant’s conduct involves separate acts stemming from ‘successive impulses.'”
The Court’s Reasoning – Double Jeopardy
The Court ruled Trappman committed two separate offenses when he battered the officer by shoving him, followed by siccing the dog on the officer, causing scarring, a fresh battery in aggravated form. Although, as Trappman argues, the two offenses for which he was convicted were “committed during one continuous criminal episode with one criminal intent,” they were, in fact, offenses resulting from “successive impulses.”
The Court notes the importance of Blockburger’s two tests, declaring that:
“[m]ultiple punishments are precluded only when the charged offenses are both the same in fact and the same in law. So it is essential that the distinct acts test not be conflated or confused with – or displaced by – the same-elements test. Acts are distinct when they result from ‘successive impulses’ even when the character of the acts is the same.”
A battery is not necessarily a continuing offense that will always constitute one ongoing criminal act, but rather, can be committed uno ictu (in one blow). The Court emphasizes that “[w]hen the impulse is single, but one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may continue. If successive impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a common stream of action, separate indictments lie.” Thus:
“[a]fter Trappman first battered the officer by shoving him and the officer shoved back, Trappman responded to the officer’s resistance not by continuing the shoving match but by using the pit bull to escalate his violence against the officer. Trappman’s conduct unquestionably “unite[d] in swelling a common stream of action.”
Moreover, the Court applies a Florida statute which explains how courts are to apply separate punishments “for separate offenses that are committed during one criminal transaction or episode.” The statute requires that defendants be punished separately when convicted of one or more separate criminal offenses even if committed “in the course of one criminal transaction or episode.” Although the statute says that “[f]or the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not,” the Court reasons that the statute is not inconsistent with Blockburger’s “distinct acts” test. The defendant committed two separate offenses prompted by two different impulses, thus, Blockburger’s “same elements” test is not triggered.
The Court concludes that “Blockburger’s distinct acts analysis provides the appropriate basis for deciding the issue in this case… [b]ecause [it] serves to implement the statutory directive to ‘convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed.'” Thus, Trappman was properly punished for two separate offenses which were prompted by two separate impulses to violate two separate criminal statutes.
The Bottom Line
This is a difficult opinion to digest – as it requires some abstract thinking, some gap-filling, and a bit of nuanced analysis – but ultimately, I believe the Court got it right. The threshold question to be considered is whether an offense (meaning, both a course of criminal conduct and a statutory criminal prohibition) is “the same.” I think the Court is correct that in order for an offense to be the same, it must be both the same in law (different elements test) and in fact (distinct acts test).
Let’s break down what it means for an offense to be the same (or different) in law and in fact. For two offenses (statutory criminal prohibitions) to be different in law, each statute must contain an element not contained in the other. Florida law defines battery as a person who:
- Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or
- Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person.
Florida law defines aggravated battery as a person who commits a battery and:
- Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or
- Uses a deadly weapon.
Here, it’s clear that the aggravated battery statute includes an element not present in the battery statute (intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or uses a deadly weapon). However, the battery statute does not include an element that is not present in the aggravated battery statute. Thus, it appears these two offenses (battery and aggravated battery) are “the same.”
There is one wrinkle, however, so stay with me. Double jeopardy law (under its different elements test) considers “lesser-included” offenses to be “the same.” Thus, it appears that Florida’s battery and aggravated battery statutes are “the same” in law since battery is very clearly a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery. So why did the Court rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated?
Well, we have to move on to the second part of the Court’s analysis. Remember, the Double Jeopardy Clause is triggered only if the offenses are “the same” in law and in fact. For two offenses to be different in fact, each offense (meaning, a course of criminal conduct) must be prompted by separate impulses to violate a statute.
In this case, Trappman acted on one impulse to commit a battery against the officer by shoving him – a violation of Florida’s battery statute having been completed at that point. Trappman then acted on a separate impulse to commit an aggravated battery against the officer by siccing his dog on him, causing scarring – a violation of Florida’s aggravated battery statute having been completed at that point. Despite the fact that this occurred during the course of one continuous criminal episode, the two offenses (courses of criminal conduct) were not “the same” because they were each triggered by separate impulses to violate the law (first the battery law, then the aggravated battery law).
The Court concludes that because the two offenses were not “the same” in fact, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not triggered, and multiple punishments were properly applied. The Court’s analysis requires a good bit of mental gymnastics, but I think it complies with Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence, Florida law, and good old-fashioned logos.
John Q. Prosecutor