In Commonwealth v. Mattis, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in a split 4-3 vote, ruled that life without parole (LWOP) sentences for adults aged 18-20 violate the Constitution of Massachusetts.
The Facts & Procedural History
The defendant, Sheldon Mattis, his codefendant, Nyasani Watt, and another friend observed the victim, Kimoni Elliot, standing near a convenience store. Mattis approached Elliot and asked him where he was from. Elliot told him “Everton,” and they parted ways. Minutes later, Mattis and Watt saw Elliot again. Believing Elliot was from a rival gang, he handed Mattis a gun and told him to “go handle that.” Watt then approached Elliot and another man named Jaivon Blake, and shot them from behind. Elliot survived, but Blake died from his wounds.
Mattis and his codefendant were charged with first-degree murder and tried together. They were both convicted. Watt, who was 17 at the time of the crime, received a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 15 years. Mattis was 18 at the time of the crime and was given a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole.
The defense filed a motion for a new trial arguing that his mandatory life sentence without parole violated the Massachusetts Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court denied the motion. The Court affirmed his conviction but remanded the case back to the trial court for “development of the record with regard to research on brain development after the age of seventeen” so that it could make a decision as to the constitutionality of Mattis’s sentence.
The Law
The Massachusetts Constitution’s Declaration of Rights, Article 26 reads: “No magistrate or court of law, shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments.” Determining the constitutionality of a criminal sentence requires the Court to look at its own precedent as well as “objective indicia” of “contemporary standards of decency which mark the progress of society.”
The Court’s assessment of contemporary standards of decency includes reviewing advancements in scientific research on the brains of “emerging adults,” state statutes, “other policies and programs in the Commonwealth, [the Court’s] precedent, other States’ statutes, as well as other States’ judicial rulings, and even international statutes and decisions, among other sources.”
The Court must also consider a “fundamental precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense.”
The Court’s Reasoning — Cruel And Unusual Punishment
The Court considers its own precedent and that of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court notes how the U.S. Supreme Court has declared the following to be unconstitutional as to juvenile defendants under the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment:
- Death penalty
- Life without parole for non-homicide convictions
- Mandatory life without parole
The Court itself declared in 2013 all life without parole sentences for juveniles to be unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution.
The Court then considers “objective indicia” of “contemporary standards of decency.” It begins with an assessment of the “updated research on the brains of emerging adults, as well as the way emerging adults are treated in the Commonwealth and elsewhere, to determine whether a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is proportionate and thus constitutional when imposed upon that class of offenders.”
The Court highlights the way in which the brains of emerging adults (which the court defines as those aged 18-20) differ significantly from older persons in four critical ways, including 1) impulse control 2) risk taking in pursuit of reward 3) peer influence, and 4) capacity for change. The Court concludes that “[t]he evidence outlined [] provides a scientifically informed view of emerging adults’ culpability and factors into our analysis whether contemporary standards of decency permit sentencing that cohort to life without the possibility of parole.”
Finally, the Court finds additional evidence of contemporary standards of decency in its review of state statutes, “other policies and programs in the Commonwealth, [the Court’s] precedent, other States’ statutes, as well as other States’ judicial rulings, and even international statutes and decisions, among other sources.” The Court cites a litany of statutes from Massachusetts and other States, as well as court decisions from other States and foreign nations, all of which support declaring life without parole sentences for those aged 18-20 unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under the Massachusetts Constitution.
The Bottom Line
The Court’s analysis here is off — way off. While this isn’t a constitutional law blog, this particular opinion requires a review of proper constitutional interpretation in order to reach its criminal law implications.
Chief Justice John Marshall, in everyone’s favorite U.S. Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison, famously said that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This concept can be confusing to some. It doesn’t mean the judiciary is empowered to say what the law should be, but rather what the law actually is. Tragically, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indulged in the former and enthusiastically ignored the latter.
So how does a court properly interpret a constitutional provision in order to say what the law is? Well, it must discover its original public meaning. A constitution’s original public meaning is what the law is. Many times this requires digging into historical documents, in search of contextual clues surrounding a particular provision’s adoption. Yes, sometimes judges must act as historians.
Here, the Court doesn’t even pretend to search for the original public meaning of Article 26 of the Massachusetts Constitution. Instead, it conducts a thorough review of U.S. Supreme Court and its own questionable precedent, much of which sits on shaky constitutional grounds for reasons similar to why this opinion leaves much to be desired. The legal force of stare decisis being its only savior.
Moreover, it descends down a dubious path of constitutional incongruity when it looks up to the heavens and magically recognizes “contemporary standards of decency which mark the progress of society.” Are seven (or in this case, four) unelected lawyers in black robes equipped or empowered to tell us what contemporary standards of decency which mark the progress of society are? No. Are contemporary standards of decency which mark the progress of society relevant to the original public meaning of constitutional provisions? No. Do modern statutes, court decisions, or foreign law provide any insight into the original public meaning of Article 26 of the Massachusetts Constitution, adopted in 1780? No.
The Court, in an effort to cloak under the guise of law, its insatiable appetite to say what the law should be, offends Article 30 of the Massachusetts Constitution — the separation of powers doctrine. The Court usurps the role of the Massachusetts legislature when it considers contemporary standards of decency to change sentencing law. The Court engages in capricious “judicial line drawing,” as highlighted by the dissent, when it limits its ruling to those under the age of 21 despite the noted scientific research which says adults older than 20 are “deserving of protection.”
I don’t necessarily take a position on whether life sentences for adults who commit first-degree murder while under the age of 21 is good or bad policy. Frankly, I may not be qualified to pass judgement on this issue — but neither is the Court. What I do know is that the Court commandeers the legislature’s role when it legislates sentencing law — a role properly retained by a democratically-elected branch of government.
The Court fails to properly interpret a constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Was a life sentence for adults under the age of 21 who committed first-degree murder cruel and unusual when that provision was adopted as law in 1780? I think we all know the answer to that question. If it wasn’t cruel and unusual then — it isn’t cruel and unusual today.
Want to ban life sentences for adults under the age of 21 who commit first-degree murder? Pass a law. The Court shouldn’t read a ban into the State’s supreme law when it isn’t there. That’s just lazy. It’s bad constitutional law. It’s bad criminal law.
John Q. Prosecutor