In People v. Messano, a divided New York Court of Appeals ruled that police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, and that the subsequent seizure of a gun was properly suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search.
The Facts & Procedural History
Syracuse Detective Bryan Hart was on patrol when he saw a vehicle “driving erratically” through heavy traffic, crossing a double yellow line, then observed it drive up to the car driven by the defendant, Joshua Messano, when both drivers had a “shouted conversation,” before pulling into a parking lot of a closed business.
Detective Hart watched the two men from about 50 – 75 yards away as Messano stepped out of his vehicle and stuck his head through the window of the other car. Detective Hart observed behavior that he believed indicated a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Messano appeared nervous and would alternate between looking at his phone, talking to the other driver, and looking at his surroundings.
Eventually, a third vehicle joined and out stepped the driver who was known to Detective Hart by name and who had prior arrests for drug possession. The driver of the third vehicle joined the other two.
Detective Hart called for additional officers to assist him. Deputy Young responded and approached the three vehicles. Messano was seated in the driver’s seat of his vehicle with the door open, the other two standing nearby. Messano stepped out of his car, closed the door, and walked towards Deputy Young. Deputy Young stopped him, patted him down for weapons and told him to stand at the rear of his police car. Deputy Young then walked over to Messano’s vehicle, “looked at the driver’s side, the window was completely down, and observed a rolled dollar bill and white substance on the driver’s side seat.” Deputy Young immediately recognized it as cocaine. Messano was arrested, his vehicle was searched, and drugs and a loaded handgun were found.
The defense moved to suppress all evidence found inside Messano’s car, arguing police had no reasonable suspicion to detain him, and all evidence seized was the fruit of an unlawful search. The trial court denied the motion.
Messano was later convicted of second degree criminal possession of a weapon. The defense appealed the trial court’s suppression ruling.
The Law
The United States and New York Constitutions both prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Police may temporarily detain individuals if the police have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity,” commonly known as reasonable suspicion. These temporary detentions fall outside the scope of constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.
New York law defines reasonable suspicion as “that quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand.”
The police may seize property when it is in “plain view” without violating constitutional prohibitions if “(i) they are lawfully in a position to observe the item; (ii) they have lawful access to the item itself when they seize it; and (iii) the incriminating character of the item is immediately apparent.”
New York appellate courts must consider “lower court determinations of reasonable suspicion and plain view[,] [which] present mixed questions of law and fact[,] beyond [their] review.” Moreover, this “rule applies ‘where the facts are disputed, where credibility is at issue or where reasonable minds may differ as to the inference to be drawn.'”
The Court’s Reasoning — Reasonable Suspicion
The Court holds that Detective Young did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Messano, noting that “[d]efendant’s behavior, viewed in totality, was equivocal and susceptible of an innocent interpretation, and therefore could not form the basis for reasonable suspicion that he had engaged in a crime.”
The Court points to the fact that Detective Hart never actually saw anything change hands between Messano and the other driver. Moreover, the Court notes that the third driver’s presence (the one who Detective Hart knew from prior drug possession arrests) “could not provide reasonable suspicion because police did not observe defendant engage in a transaction with the third driver.” Finally, the Court seemingly implies that Detective Hart’s observations lacked credibility because they were made “from 50-75 yards away.”
The Court’s Reasoning — Plain View Doctrine
The Court quickly dispels the notion that the plain view doctrine applies under these facts, holding that “there is no record evidence or any reasonable inference that Young was in a position to view the contraband absent the unlawful detention of defendant.” The Court asserts that “had the officers not unlawfully detained defendant behind the car, defendant could have walked back, opened the car door and sat on the driver’s seat — actions that… would have blocked Young’s view of the contraband.”
The Bottom Line
The Court divided 4-3 on these issues, after the lower appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the defense’s motion to suppress — and I’m not surprised. The Court got it wrong here — very wrong.
Reasonable suspicion is a very low standard — the lowest, really. The Court defines it as “that quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand.” Detective Hart articulated such a “quantum of knowledge.” He testified that he saw a vehicle commit one or more traffic violations, pull up to the defendant’s vehicle where the driver of that vehicle and Messano have a shouted conversation, after which both vehicles pull into the parking lot of a closed business. Detective Hart then watches Messano engage in behavior that he believes indicates drug activity.
Finally, a known drug offender pulls up to meet with both Messano and the other driver! If the totality of these facts and circumstances don’t constitute reasonable suspicion, then I don’t know what does.
The Court goes wrong because it fails to adopt the proper standard in its review. The dissent scolds the Court for its dereliction, noting:
[A]t this stage of the process [the People] are entitled to every reasonable inference from the record in support of the lower courts’ findings that they met the burden [to come forward with evidence showing the legality of the police conduct.] This Court does not act as another suppression court, marshaling and weighing the evidence to determine if the People met their burden of proof. Rather, the only question for us is whether the lower courts’ conclusion that they did meet that burden is supported by the record, affording the prevailing party all reasonable inferences. Here, the record amply supports both holdings and we should affirm.
It’s pretty clear the Court reweighs the evidence and makes its own credibility determinations. Remember, it seems to question whether Detective Hart could even see what he says he saw, emphasizing that he was 50-75 yards away at the time of observation.
Further, the Court appears to assess each fact tending to indicate reasonable suspicion in a vacuum, declaring each one insufficient. The Court should have evaluated the entire record in its totality. Detective Hart met his burden and Messano was lawfully detained.
What about the plain view doctrine? The Court’s assertion that had not Deputy Young unlawfully detained him, Messano “could have walked back, opened the car door and sat on the driver’s seat — actions that… would have blocked Young’s view of the contraband.” What an absurd explanation. It further defies the proper standard of review and — well — logic. Yes, I suppose, but for the detention, Messano could have run back to his car, sat on the driver’s seat, and obstructed the officer’s view. He could have just as likely stayed right where he was.
The dissent also bemoans the Court’s lack of common sense, noting that “[a]ny attempt by defendant to sprint back to the car ahead of Young ‘would likely have aroused the officers’ suspicion.'” “Moreover, opening the car door in front of the officer in order to get back in would have made the view of the drugs plainer still.”
The drugs and handgun were in plain view. The officer, from a lawful position to observe, saw the contraband through the window of Messano’s car. Any first-year law student could spot this issue (and the proper legal analysis) a mile away, or at least 50-75 yards away. Why? Because the issue is — in plain view! Still, the New York Court of Appeals, somehow, missed it.
John Q. Prosecutor